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We consider the security of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol for Quantum Key Dis-
tribution (QKD), in the presence of bit and basis dependent detector flaws. We suggest a powerful
attack that can be used in systems with detector efficiency mismatch, even if the detector assign-
ments are chosen randomly by Bob. A security proof is provided, valid for any basis dependent,
possibly lossy, linear optical imperfections in the channel/receiver/detectors. The proof does not
assume the so-called squashing detector model.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum mechanics makes it possible to exchange a
random bit string at a distance [1–4]. In theory, the key
distribution is secure, even if an eavesdropper Eve can do
anything allowed by the currently known laws of nature
[5–8].
In practical QKD systems there will always be imper-
fections. The security of QKD systems with a large vari-
ety of imperfections has been proved [6, 9–11]. However,
a QKD system is relatively complex, and loopholes and
imperfections exist that are not covered by existing secu-
rity proofs. A security loophole can be dealt with in two
different ways: Either you modify the implementation,
or you increase the amount of privacy amplification [12]
required to remove Eve’s information about the key. The
first approach, to modify the implementation, may often
be done without decreasing the rate of which secret key
can be generated. It may however increase the complex-
ity of the implementation, which in turn may lead to
new loopholes. The advantages of the second approach,
to increase the amount of privacy amplification, are that
the apparatus can be kept as simple as possible, and that
existing implementations can be made secure with a soft-
ware update. A drawback is clearly the reduced key rate,
which is considered as a critical parameter in commercial
QKD systems.
One of the imperfections to be considered in this pa-
per, is called detector efficiency mismatch (DEM) [13].
If an apparatus has DEM, Eve can control the efficien-
cies of Bob’s detectors by choosing a parameter t in some
external domain. Examples of such domains can be the
timing, polarization, or frequency of the photons [13, 14].
To be more concrete, consider DEM in the time-
domain. In most QKD systems Bob’s apparatus contains
two single photon detectors to detect the incoming pho-
tons, one for each bit value. (Equivalently, two different
detection windows of a single detector can be used for the
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FIG. 1: An example of mismatched efficiency curves for two
detectors in the time-domain. The functions η0(t) and η1(t)
are the efficiencies of detector 0 and 1, respectively. The pa-
rameter t can be used to parametrize other domains as well.
two bit values (time-multiplexed detector).) Normally
the detectors are gated in the time-domain to avoid high
dark-counts. This means that electronic circuits are used
to turn the detectors on and off, creating detection win-
dows. Different optical path lengths, inaccuracies in the
electronics, and finite precision in detector manufactur-
ing may cause the detection windows of the two detectors
to be slightly shifted, as seen in Fig. 1. The shift means
that there exist times where the two detectors have dif-
ferent efficiencies.
Systems with DEM can be attacked with a faked-states
attack [13]. The faked-states attack is an intercept-
resend attack where Eve does not try to reconstruct
the original state sent by Alice, but rather exploit the
imperfections in Bob’s apparatus to hide errors. The
faked-states attack can be adapted to the Scarani-Acin-
Ribordy-Gisin 2004 (SARG04), Ekert, and Differential
Phase Shift Keying (DPSK) protocols, in addition to
BB84 [15]. Another attack on systems with DEM is
the time-shift attack [16]. In this attack Eve just se-
lects the timing of each qubit randomly, thereby gain-
ing information about the bit value when Bob announces
which qubits were received and which were lost. The
major advantage of the time-shift attack is that it does
2not introduce any quantum bit error rate (QBER). It has
been demonstrated experimentally that the security of a
commercially available QKD system can be compromised
with a time-shift attack [17].
A frequently mentioned countermeasure for systems
with DEM is called four-state Bob [13, 16, 18, 19]. In
a phase-encoded QKD system, Bob chooses from four
different phase settings {0, π/2, π, 3π/2} instead of only
two {0, π/2}. This will randomly assign the bit values 0
and 1 to the detectors (or the detection windows, in the
case of one time-multiplexed detector) for each received
state. Therefore Eve does not know which detector char-
acteristics that corresponds to the 0 and 1 detectors.
However, as mentioned previously [13, 16] Eve may
use a large laser pulse attack [20–23] to read Bob’s phase
modulator settings. In a large pulse attack Eve uses a
strong laser pulse to measure the reflections from either
Alice’s or Bob’s apparatus. The setting of the phase mod-
ulator may give a signature on the reflections, enabling
Eve to obtain the phase.
First assume that Eve is able to read Alice’s modu-
lator settings. Then Eve could obtain bit and/or basis
information before the pulse enters Bob’s apparatus, and
therefore the security would be seriously compromised.
Fortunately, Alice’s implementation can easily be modi-
fied to avoid the large pulse attack. A setup with a coher-
ent laser source contains an attenuator, and moving this
to the end of the apparatus, as well as introducing an op-
tical isolator, will put impossible requirements on Eve’s
laser [23]. In “plug-and-play” systems Alice already uses
a detector to monitor the input of her setup. Therefore
a large pulse attack can easily be revealed by monitoring
the intensity of the input.
In a straightforward implementation of BB84, the
phase modulator setting in Bob’s setup only contains ba-
sis information. It usually poses no security threat if Eve
reads the basis, as she will get it during the public dis-
cussion anyway. One only has to avoid that Eve receives
the basis information before the pulse enters Bob’s ap-
paratus. This can be taken care of by placing a properly
long coil of optical fiber at the entrance of Bob’s setup.
However, if the DEM loophole is patched with four-
state Bob, the large pulse attack is dangerous, because
it may give Eve information about the detector assign-
ments. Modifying Bob’s setup to avoid large pulse at-
tacks is not an easy task. The most practical solution
seems to be a beam splitter or an optical circulator com-
bined with an intensity detector [23]. Note that the key
rate will suffer; the the input of Bob’s setup is precious
single photons. Also the setup gets more complex, which
should be avoided as far as possible, to limit the number
of “hidden surprises”. It is therefore not obvious whether
such modifications should be implemented, or whether
the security should be regained with extra privacy ampli-
fication. Even though some systems implement four-state
Bob, several of them lack countermeasures for a strong
pulse attack on Bob’s side. Therefore we will pursue the
latter solution, i.e., we assume that Eve is able to read
Bob’s phase modulator setting after Bob’s detection.
Security bounds state a unconditionally secure key
rate, positive a range in some parameter(s). Ideally one
should be able to prove the converse, namely that with
the parameter(s) outside this range the QKD-system is
provable insecure. Unfortunately this is not always sim-
ple. Usually there is a third range of the parameter(s)
where it is not known whether the QKD-protocol is se-
cure. For instance with perfect devices and one-way clas-
sical communication, the QKD-system is unconditionally
secure for QBER < 11 % [8], and provable insecure for
QBER > 14.6 % [24]. Until the gap is closed the security
bounds represent a lower bound on the secure key rate,
and the best known attacks represent an upper bound.
Fung et al. found a security bound for QKD systems
with DEM [14]. QKD systems with four-state Bob is
proved to be secure, provided Eve cannot read Bob’s
phase settings with a large pulse attack. The security
proof assumes the so-called squashing model [9].
In this paper we first establish an upper bound for the
secure key rate of QKD-system with DEM by presenting
two powerful attacks, one of which even applies to im-
plementations with four-state Bob (Section II). Then we
will establish a lower bound for the secure key rate by
providing a simple security proof of QKD systems with
general, basis and bit dependent detector flaws (Section
III), generalizing the proof by Fung et al. More precisely,
any basis dependent, possibly lossy, linear optical imper-
fections in the channel and receiver are covered by the
proof. For example, the proof covers mixing between all
available optical modes, misalignments, mode-dependent
losses, DEM, and any basis dependence of those effects.
The proof is formulated for a decoy-state BB84 protocol
and does not assume a squashing model. Finally, in Sec-
tion IV we will examine some examples, including DEM,
DEM with mode mixing, and DEM with misalignment.
II. SECURITY ANALYSIS: UPPER BOUND
In this section we analyse two powerful attacks
on systems with DEM. Such attacks are impor-
tant because they establish a regime where QKD-
systems with DEM is provable insecure. To ana-
lyze the attacks, for the moment we define η =
max {mint η1(t)/η0(t),mint η0(t)/η1(t)} ∈ [0, 1], repre-
senting the smallest efficiency ratio available for both bit
values. For individual attacks the secret key rate is given
by [12, 25] (given one-way classical communication)
R = I(α : β)− I(α : ǫ), (1)
where I(· : ·) denotes mutual information and α, β, and
ǫ represent Alice’s, Bob’s and Eve’s bits.
In the previous analysis of the faked-states attack [13],
the attack was limited by the introduced QBER rather
than Eve’s insufficient knowledge about the key. By at-
tacking only a fraction of the bits with the faked-states
attack one can compromise the security for even higher
3values of η. The other fraction could be attacked with
the time-shift attack [16] which introduces no QBER.
To tailor E, the QBER measured by Alice and Bob,
the fraction r attacked by the faked-states attack is given
by
r =
E
Efs
= E
1 + 3η
2η
, (2)
where Efs = 2η/(1 + 3η) is the QBER introduced by
the faked-states attack. The mutual information between
Alice and Eve is given by
I(α : ǫ) = rI(α : ǫ)fs + (1− r)I(α : ǫ)ts
= 1− E − h( η
1 + η
)
(
1− 1 + 3η
2η
E
)
,
(3)
where r is given in (2) and I(α : ǫ)fs = 1 − E and
I(α : ǫ)ts = 1 − h(η/(1 + η)) denote the mutual infor-
mation in the faked-states and the time-shift attack, re-
spectively, as given in Refs [13, 16]. h(·) is the binary
entropy function. Since Alice and Bob does not know
how each bit is attacked, I(α : β) is simply given by
1− h(E). The key rate (1) thus becomes
R = E + h(
η
1 + η
)
(
1− 1 + 3η
2η
E
)
− h(E). (4)
Without considering DEM, Alice and Bob think that the
key is secure when QBER < 11% (symmetric protocols
with one-way classical communication [8]). Solving the
equality R = 0, where R is given by (4), and setting
E = 0.11 gives η = 0.215.
The above combined attack is implementable with cur-
rent technology. Up to η = 0.160 it represent an upper
bound on the secure key rate (see Fig. 3). However with
four-state Bob, the attack is impossible since the faked-
states attack requires knowledge of the bit-detector map-
ping before Bob receives the pulse.
For higher values of η there exists an even more efficient
attack. The optimal individual attack in the absence of
imperfections is known [24]. Here Eve lets the qubit from
Alice interact with a probe. After the basis is revealed,
Eve’s probe is in one of two non-orthogonal states [24]
|ξ0〉 = |0〉 (5a)
|ξ1〉 = cosϕ|0〉+ sinϕ|1〉, (5b)
where ϕ is related to the QBER by
cosϕ = 1− 2E. (6)
Eve has to separate between |ξ0〉, corresponding to the bit
value 0 at Alice, and |ξ1〉, corresponding to the bit value
1. The two states occur with an a priori probability 1/2.
In the presence of DEM, we improve the attack as fol-
lows: In addition to using a probe, Eve launches a time-
shift attack. If Bob announces receipt, the probabilities
of the two bit values is now {1/ (1 + η) , η/ (1 + η)} ac-
cording to the time-shift attack [16]. Then after the pub-
lic discussion, Eve has to separate between the states (5)
with the a priori probabilities {1/ (1 + η) , η/ (1 + η)}.
The optimal measurement is projective [26], and the
probability p of Eve measuring the correct bit value is
found to be
p =
(
1
1 + η
)
cos2
[
1
2
arctan
(
sin 2ϕ
1
η − cos 2ϕ
)]
+
(
η
1 + η
)
sin2
[
ϕ+
1
2
arctan
(
sin 2ϕ
1
η − cos 2ϕ
)]
,
(7)
where ϕ is related to the QBER as in Eq. (6).
Since Eve has probability p to have the same bit value
as Alice, I(α : ǫ) is simply 1 − h(p). I(α : β) is given
by 1− h(E). The key rate (1) for this improved optimal
individual attack is thus
R = h(p)− h(E), (8)
where p is given by (7).
Without considering DEM, Alice and Bob think that
the key is secure when QBER < 11%. Solving the equal-
ity R = 0, where R is given by (8), and setting E = 0.11
gives η = 0.252. In a commercial QKD system η was
found to be approximately 0.25 (see Fig. 3 in [17]) [38].
Therefore, this attack could be used to compromise the
security of such QKD systems. Note that the attack
does not require the bit-detector mapping until the post-
processing step. Therefore systems patched with four-
state Bob are vulnerable to the attack combined with a
large pulse attack.
Note that the both attacks represent a substantial im-
provement compared to the previously published attacks
which require η < 0.066 [13]. Fig. 3 shows the range of
E, η which compromises security, and compares the two
attacks.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS: LOWER BOUND
In this section we will prove the security of the BB84
protocol in the presence of bit and basis dependent de-
tector flaws, and establish the secure key generation rate.
We will prove the security in a general setting, lifting
the so-called squashing model assumption. That is, Eve
may send any multimode, photonic state, and Bob uses
practical threshold detectors. Alice may use a single-
photon source or phase-randomized faint laser pulses; in
the latter case, Alice may use decoy states [27–29] to
estimate photon-number dependent parameters. Alice’s
source is otherwise assumed perfect: It emits an inco-
herent mixture of photonic number states, randomly in
logical modes “0” or “1”, randomly in the X or Z bases,
with no correlation between the bits, bases, and photon
number statistics [30].
The state space accessible to Eve consists of the Fock
space associated with all photonic modes supported by
the channel. The channel and receiver is modeled as a
basis-dependent quantum operation, CZ and CX , in front
4of two threshold detectors. Here Z and X denote the
bases chosen by Bob. Since reduced detector efficiencies
can be absorbed into the quantum operations, we can let
Bob’s threshold detectors have perfect efficiency. Dark
counts are attributed to Eve, and for double click events,
Bob assigns a random value to his bit [9, 10].
In our security proof, the key condition of CZ and CX
is that they are passive, in the sense of
|0〉 → |0〉, (9)
where |0〉 denotes the vacuum state of all modes. In other
words, vacuum incident to all modes gives vacuum out.
This condition is rather general; it includes all linear and
nonlinear optical transformations of the modes supported
by the channel.
For simplicity, however, we will restrict ourselves to
linear optical imperfections. Bob’s two detectors may
still have different efficiencies, depending on the time,
frequency, and/or polarization of the incoming states.
Moreover, there may be imperfections in the channel and
Bob’s receiver. This can be described as arbitrary, square
matrices CZ and CX , acting on the channel modes after
Eve’s intervention. The linear-optical property of CZ
and CX is ensured from the fact that they are classi-
cal transformations (or transfer matrices) operating on
the physical, photonic modes (e.g. temporal modes and
polarization modes) rather than the total Fock space of
the modes. Each mode can contain any photonic state
such as number states or coherent states. Although CZ
and CX have finite dimension, the associated, induced
quantum operations CZ and CX operate on an infinite di-
mensional Fock space. We use the convention that Bob’s
basis selector is included in CX (see Subsection IVA).
With singular value decomposition, we can write
CZ = UZFZVZC, (10)
where UZ and VZ are unitary operators, and FZ is a
diagonal, positive matrix. In addition to the usual singu-
lar value decomposition, we have included an extra ma-
trix factor C, governing losses and imperfections in the
channel and/or receiver, independent of the basis chosen
by Bob. The matrix C may for example describe loss
of the channel and time-dependent detector efficiencies
common for the two detectors. The operator C can be
absorbed into Eve’s attack, thus it never appears in the
following analysis. The unitary operators UZ and VZ
mix the modes together. For example, VZ is the result
of sending the modes through a network isomorphic to
the type in [31]. The diagonal matrix FZ represents the
different efficiencies of the two detectors (in addition to
basis-dependent absorptions in the receiver), and satisfies
|FZ |2 = diag
[
ηZ0(t1) ηZ1(t1) ηZ0(t2) ηZ1(t2) . . .
]
.
(11)
The parameters tj , j = 1, 2, . . . label different modes. For
example, tj may correspond to different temporal modes.
In the absence of UZ and VZ , ηZ0(tj) and ηZ1(tj) can
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FIG. 2: a) Actual protocol. b) Estimation of Alice’s virtual
X-basis measurement. c) Simplification of Fig. 2b from Bob’s
point of view. d) Actual parameter estimation in the X-basis.
be viewed as the efficiencies of detector 0 and 1 in the
Z-basis. Otherwise the efficiencies ηZ0(tj) and ηZ1(tj)
do not necessarily correspond to the detectors 0 and 1,
respectively, nor to detection time tj. However, the nota-
tion is selected as in the special case for intuition. Note
that FZ may be represented as a collection of beam split-
ters with transmittivities ηZ0(t1), ηZ1(t1), and so forth.
Then each mode is incident to its own beam splitter, and
the vacuum state is sent into the other input.
The resulting model is shown in Fig. 2a. In the model
we have included an extra measurement, giving infor-
mation to Eve whether the total state is equal to the
vacuum |0〉. While this information actually comes from
Bob, it is convenient to let Eve obtain this information
from a separate measurement. Note that this extra vac-
uum measurement does not disturb Bob’s measurement
statistics for any basis choice.
We will prove security using Koashi’s argument [30, 32,
33] which we briefly summarize here. In the BB84-like
actual protocol Alice generates a large number of bipar-
tite states, where her part consists of a qubit which she
measures randomly in the X- or Z-basis. The other part
of the pairs is sent to Bob via Eve. Bob measures what he
receives from Eve randomly in two different bases, which
we will refer to as the “X-basis” or the “Z-basis”. For
example, for polarization encoding Bob’s two measure-
ments should ideally correspond to threshold detectors in
horizontal/vertical or ±45◦ polarization bases, with dou-
ble clicks as random assignment. Alice and Bob discard
all events where they used incompatible basis. Further
he publicly announces receipt if he receives something
different from vacuum. Let QX and QZ be the fractions
of non-vacuum results in each basis. Alice and Bob com-
pare their X-basis measurement results to estimate QX
and the error rate EX . The N states measured in the
Z-basis yield NQZ non-vacuum results. For these NQZ
events Alice’s measurement result is the raw key.
The required amount of privacy amplification can be
found as follows: imagine a virtual experiment where Al-
5ice measures the qubits for the raw key in the X-basis
instead of the Z-basis. Bob tries to predict the result of
Alice’s virtual X-basis measurement. Bob does not per-
form such a prediction in practice; thus in this prediction
we may let Bob do everything permitted by quantum
mechanics, as long as he does not alter the information
given to Eve. Let HvirtX(A|B = µ) denote the entropy
of Alice’s virtual X-basis measurement result, given mea-
surement result µ in Bob’s prediction. It turns out that
HvirtX(A|B = µ) can be bounded using EX and QX , so
assume that HvirtX(A|B = µ) ≤ H . Since the uncer-
tainty about Alice X-measurement is less than H , the
entropic uncertainty relation [34] suggests that any pre-
diction (including Eves prediction) of the measurement
result of Alice Z-basis measurement will have at least
NQZ − H entropy. Thus Alice can extract NQZ − H
bits of secret key. Rigorously, this rate is found by con-
certizing the privacy amplification procedure by universal
hashing. Although Koashi’s original proof is formulated
with an obsolete security definition based on accessible
information, the proof can easily be adapted to a com-
posable security definition [35–37].
Bob must ensure that he has an identical raw key.
Since it does not matter to Eve what Bob does (as long as
he gives Eve the same information), he measures the bits
for the raw key in the Z-basis. Alice and Bob compares a
subset of the raw key to find the error rate EZ (consum-
ing some of the raw key, but negliable in the asymptotic
limit), and Alice sends Bob NQZh(EZ) bits of error cor-
recting information consuming NQZh(EZ) bits of pre-
viously established secret key. In the asymptotic limit
N →∞ the net secure key generation rate becomes
RZ ≥ 1− H
NQZ
− h(EZ). (12)
Note that H is needed to ensure that Alice’s key is
secret, and this only requires X-basis parameters to be
estimated by Alice and Bob. Thus there is no need to in-
voke the classicalization argument [5] regarding statistics
of measurements involved in the simultaneous estimation
of EX and EZ .
For his prediction, Bob will use the virtual measure-
ment in Fig. 2b. Bob first applies the unitary operator
U †Z , followed by the filter F¯Z , and the unitary opera-
tor V †Z . Then he applies the operator CX = UXFXVX .
Finally he performs an X-basis measurement. Note that
we retain Eve’s vacuum measurement and all components
preceding it, so Eve obtains the identical information as
in Fig. 2a. The matrix F¯Z is diagonal, and is given by
F¯ZFZ =
√
ηZI, (13)
where
ηZ = min
ij
{ηZi(tj)}. (14)
Similarly to FZ , the filter F¯Z is implementable by beam
splitters acting separately on each mode. The largest
element of |F¯Z |2 is 1, while the smallest element is
ηZ/maxij{ηZi(tj)}.
To analyze how well Bob performs in his prediction,
we will now simplify the system in Fig. 2b to deter-
mine Bob’s measurement statistics. To do this, we
introduce an extra vacuum measurement right before
Bob’s detectors, assuming nobody records the outcome.
Clearly, Bob’s measurement statistics are not altered
by the presence of this extra measurement. The filter
UXFXVXV
†
Z F¯ZU
†
Z obeys (9), being a linear optical trans-
formation. As a result, we show in the appendix that the
output state, after the extra vacuum measurement, is in-
dependent of the presence of Eve’s vacuum measurement
(i.e., the first vacuum measurement, after UZ in Fig. 2b).
Thus, to estimate Bob’s measurement statistics, we can
remove Eve’s vacuum measurement. We end up with the
simplified system shown in Fig. 2c. Note that the sim-
plified system is identical to the system in Fig. 2d, the
actual protocol when Bob has chosen the X-basis, ex-
cept for one thing: There is an extra, mode-independent
absorption ηZ in the channel. This fact will be used for
estimating the performance of Bob’s prediction.
To prove the security also for the multiphotonic case,
we use the parameters q
(1)
X and e
(1)
X assumed known from
the decoy state protocol. q
(1)
X is the fraction of Bob’s X-
basis non-vacuum events that originate from single pho-
tons at Alice. e
(1)
X is the QBER for single photon events
in the X-basis (only single photons generate secure key).
Consider the prediction in Fig. 2b-c. Let NQZ be the
number of states in the raw key. In a worst case, the num-
ber of detection events that originate from single photons
at Alice, will be only ηZq
(1)
X QXN , due to the filter
√
η
Z
I
(note that ηZQX < QZ). For each of these events Bob’s
entropic uncertainty about Alice’s bit is (asymptotically)
h(e
(1)∗
X ), where e
(1)∗
X is the associated error rate. We
note that e
(1)∗
X is not measured in the actual protocol;
it will rather be estimated below. For the events lost in
the filter
√
η
Z
I, Bob’s entropic uncertainty about Alice’s
bit is 1, since he has no detection result. Summarizing,
Bob’s entropic uncertainty about Alice’s QZN bits (cor-
responding to the number of detection events in Fig. 2a)
is at most H = QZN − ηZq(1)X QXN [1− h(e(1)∗X )]. In our
analysis we have ignored the events associated with Al-
ice sending the vacuum state [30]; their contribution will
only give a marginally larger rate. From (12) the secure
key rate becomes
RZ = −h(EZ) + ηZq(1)X QX/QZ
[
1− h(e(1)∗X )
]
. (15)
It remains to bound the parameter e
(1)∗
X , which is the
QBER for single photon events in the estimation Fig. 2b-
c. Recall that e
(1)
X is the estimated QBER for single pho-
ton events in the X-basis, Fig. 2d. The only difference
between the setup in Fig. 2c and Fig. 2d is the filter√
η
Z
I, which represent identical absorption in all modes.
However, the removal of detection events by this filter
6is dependent on the photon number, so e
(1)∗
X 6= e(1)X in
general [39]. To bound e
(1)∗
X we use the fact that the
filter only alter the detection statistics by removing de-
tection events. (An exception occurs for the few coinci-
dence counts; these can be taken into account easily.) In
a worst case,
e
(1)∗
X ≤
e
(1)
X
ηZ(1− e(1)X ) + e(1)X
≤ e(1)X /ηZ . (16)
Putting these results together, we obtain the secure key
generation rate
RZ ≥ −h(EZ) + ηZq(1)X QX/QZ
[
1− h(e(1)X /ηZ)
]
. (17)
A similar result holds when Alice and Bob have chosen
the X-basis in the actual protocol:
RX ≥ −h(EX) + ηXq(1)Z QZ/QX
[
1− h(e(1)Z /ηX)
]
. (18)
Ineqs. (17) and (18) are valid for any basis and bit de-
pendence of the channel and receiver/detectors, as long
as the imperfections (CZ and CX) can be described as
possibly lossy, linear optical operators acting on the pho-
tonic modes.
To compare our result (17) to that of Ref. [14], we let
Alice only send single photons. The rate then becomes
R ≥ −h(E) + η[1 − h(E/η)], (19)
where we have assumed symmetry between the bases, and
therefore omitted the Z and X subscripts. The rate (19)
coincides with the rate found in [14] (see Subsection IVB
for a discussion on how to identify η). Note, however,
that (19) is a stronger result in the sense that it applies
to any basis-dependent linear optical imperfections, not
only the case where UZ,X = I, and VZ,X do not mix
modes associated with different logical bits. Also it does
not require the squashing model assumption.
Under the assumption that Eve only sends single pho-
tons, it is easy to realize that (16) can be replaced by
e
(1)∗
X = e
(1)
X . Then (19) is improved to
R ≥ −h(E) + η[1− h(E)]. (20)
Fig. 3 shows the security bounds resulting from (19)
and (20) when the right-hand side is set equal to zero.
IV. EXAMPLES
A. DEM in the time-domain
Consider the case where Bob’s detectors have time-
dependent efficiencies, as indicated in Fig. 1. We assume
that the efficiencies are independent of the basis chosen
by Bob (FX = FZ). The channel and receiver are oth-
erwise assumed perfect, except for a background loss C.
Q
B
E
R
0 1η0.25
0.11
FIG. 3: Security bounds when Alice sends single photons
(q
(1)
Z
= q
(1)
X
= 1), assuming symmetry between the bases.
The bounds are found by setting the associated key genera-
tion rates equal to zero. Solid line: General security bound,
as resulting from (19). Dash-dotted line: Security bound (20)
assuming Eve sends single photons. Dashed line: The im-
provement of the optimal individual attack from Section II,
as resulting from (8). Dotted line: The combined attack from
Section II, as resulting from (4). For the attacks it is assumed
that the DEM is equal for the two bit values. The dark grey
region is proved to be insecure while the white region is proved
to be secure with extra privacy amplification. The light grey
region should be assumed insecure.
The background loss may be mode dependent, but inde-
pendent of the basis chosen by Bob.
With these assumptions, we may take CZ = FZC and
CX = FXHC = FZHC, where H is a block-diagonal
matrix consisting of 2 × 2 Hadamard matrices H(2), in-
terchanging the bases Z and X for each time:
H = diag
[
H(2) H(2) H(2) . . .
]
. (21)
To maximize the secure key rate, as much as possible of
the detector flaws should be absorbed into C. Therefore,
we factorize
FZ = FF
′, (22)
where
F ′2 = diag
[
η′(t1) η
′(t1) η
′(t2) η
′(t2) . . .
]
, (23)
and η′(tj) = max{ηZ0(tj), ηZ1(tj)}. Noting that F ′ and
H commute, we can absorb F ′ into C. The remaining
diagonal matrix F then has the role of FZ (and FX) in
the security proof. The parameter ηZ = ηX to substitute
into the secure key generation rate (17) is therefore the
minimum diagonal element of |F |2:
ηZ = min
t
min
{
ηZ0(t)
ηZ1(t)
,
ηZ1(t)
ηZ0(t)
}
. (24)
7B. DEM and restricted mode mixing
Consider the case treated by Fung et al. [14], where
there is no mixing between modes associated with differ-
ent logical bits. Then CZ can be written in block diagonal
form
CZ =
[
C0 0
0 C1
]
C, (25)
provided we reorder the modes as in
|FZ |2 = diag
[
ηZ0(t1) ηZ0(t2) . . . ηZ1(t1) ηZ1(t2) . . .
]
,
(26)
to be compared to (11). As in Ref. [14] we assume basis
independence in the sense
CX =
[
C0 0
0 C1
]
HC. (27)
Here,
H =
1√
2
[
I I
I −I
]
, (28)
with the present choice of mode order. We assume that
CZ is nonsingular. (Otherwise, the secure key generation
rate would be zero.)
We should associate as much as possible of the im-
perfections to the common channel operator C. Let the
singular-value decomposition of C0C
−1
1 be usv, where u
and v are unitary matrices, and s is diagonal and pos-
itive. Let λ2 be the maximum of max s and max s−1.
Factorize
CZ = λ
[
us1/2 0
0 v†s−1/2
]
1
λ
[
s−1/2u†C0 0
0 s1/2vC1
]
C.
(29)
Defining
C′ =
1
λ
[
s−1/2u†C0 0
0 s1/2vC1
]
, (30)
and noting that s−1/2u†C0 = s
1/2vC1, we have C
′H =
HC′. This gives
CZ = λ
[
us1/2 0
0 v†s−1/2
]
C′C, (31a)
CX = λ
[
us1/2 0
0 v†s−1/2
]
HC′C. (31b)
Similarly to the reasoning in Section III, Bob applies a
virtual filter to transform CZ into an operator propor-
tional to CX . Applying
1
λ
[
us1/2 0
0 v†s−1/2
]
H
1
λ
[
s−1/2u† 0
0 s1/2v
]
,
the operator CZ is transformed into CX/λ
2. Following
Section III,
√
η = 1/λ2. This gives
√
η = min(min s,min s−1). (32)
Equivalently, η is the minimum value of the eigen-
values and inverse eigenvalues of C0C
−1
1 (C0C
−1
1 )
† =
C0(C
†
1C1)
−1C†0 . This η should be substituted into (17)
to find the secure key generation rate.
The parameter η can be measured as follows. For sin-
gle photon input in a given superposition ψ of logical “0”
modes, the probability of a click in detector 0 is given by
ψ†C†0C0ψ. Similarly, we may use the identical superpo-
sition ψ of “1” modes to find the detection probability
of detector 1. Note that ψ denotes a classical field vec-
tor, where each element corresponds to a separate mode.
The parameter η turns out to be equal to the minimum
detection probability ratio
η = min
(
min
ψ
ψ†C†0C0ψ
ψ†C†1C1ψ
,min
ψ
ψ†C†1C1ψ
ψ†C†0C0ψ
)
. (33)
In other words, η is given by the minimum efficiency mis-
match ratio for all superpositions of input modes.
To see this, let us2u† be the spectral decomposition
of C0(C
†
1C1)
−1C†0 . Then we have C
−1†
0 (C
†
1C1)C
−1
0 =
us−2u†, and
ψ†C†1C1ψ
ψ†C†0C0ψ
=
ψ′†C−1†0 C
†
1C1C
−1
0 ψ
′
ψ′†ψ′
=
ψ′†u†s−2uψ′
ψ′†ψ′
= s−2.
(34)
Combining (32) and (34) gives the desired result.
C. DEM and misalignments
In addition to the detector efficiency mismatch in
Subsection IVA, suppose that Bob’s detectors are mis-
aligned. The misalignments may be dependent on Bob’s
choice of basis, and are described by unitary matrices VZ
and VX . This gives the channel operators CZ = FZVZC
and CX = FXVXHC. Assuming no coupling between
different temporal modes (no multiple reflections), VZ
and VX are block-diagonal matrices. For example,
VZ = diag
[
V
(2)
1 V
(2)
2 V
(2)
3 . . .
]
, (35)
where V
(2)
j are unitary 2×2 matrices. Here we have used
the same order of modes as in the original definition (11).
Taking FX = FZ and factorizing as in Subsection IVA,
we find that the parameter ηZ = ηX again is given by
(24). The secure key generation rate is then found from
(17).
If there is coupling between modes associated with dif-
ferent t’s (in addition to the misalignment), we must re-
tain the general definition of ηZ in (14). For unnormal-
ized detection efficiencies, this definition can be rewritten
ηZ =
mini,t{ηZi(t)}
maxi,t{ηZi(t)} . (36)
8Eq. (36) is obtained by absorbing the maximum detector
efficiency maxi,t{ηZi(t)} into C. Omitting the require-
ment FX = FZ , (36) must be rewritten as
ηZ =
mini,t{ηZi(t)}
max (maxi,t{ηZi(t)},maxi,t{ηXi(t)}) . (37)
D. Characterizing DEM of Bob’s receiver
To estimate the secure key generation rate, Bob must
characterize his receiver to find ηZ and ηX (or η ≡
min{ηZ , ηX}). We note that rather different results are
obtained dependent on whether or not there are coupling
between different modes. For the case of DEM in the
time-domain, since it is difficult to eliminate multiple re-
flections in Bob’s receiver, a conservative approach is to
use (37).
For the case with gated detectors, the efficiencies ap-
proach zero at the edges of the detection window. When
there are coupling between different temporal modes, the
resulting key generation rate will therefore be close to
zero. Even if no such coupling is present, the key gener-
ation rate may approach zero, since at the edges of the
detection window the efficiency ratio may be very small.
(Although the average detection probability at the edges
may be small, Eve may compensate this by replacing the
channel by a more transparent one, or by increasing the
power of her pulses [13].) A possible solution may be
that Bob monitors his input signal at all times, to en-
sure that Eve does not send photons outside the central
part of the window. Then η can be obtained by measur-
ing the minimum and maximum detection efficiency for
(superpositions of) modes with times inside this central
part.
Such a measurement may be cumbersome due to many
degrees of freedom of the possible inputs. Alternatively,
one could specify the maximum possible amount of mode
coupling in the system, and use this information to lower
bound η. Suppose that the maximum (power) cou-
pling from one mode j to all other modes is δ. Then
the unitary matrix VZ satisfies
∑
i,i6=j |Vij |2 < δ in ad-
dition to
∑
i |Vij |2 = 1, omitting the subscript Z for
clarity. Let |fj |2 be the jth diagonal element of FZ .
By measuring the detection efficiency when photons are
incident to the jth mode, we obtain
∑
i |Vij |2|fi|2 =
|fj |2 +
∑
i,i6=j |Vij |2
(|fi|2 − |fj |2). Hence, the elements
|fj |2 can be found from the detection efficiency as a
function of j of the incident mode, up to an error∣∣∣∑i,i6=j |Vij |2 (|fi|2 − |fj |2)∣∣∣ < δ. A lower bound of η
is therefore
η >
mint,basis,bit(detection efficiency)− δ
maxt,basis,bit(detection efficiency) + δ
. (38)
The required measurement is to obtain the detection ef-
ficiency as a function of t and logical bit value for both
bases. For detection efficiency mismatch in the time-
domain the test pulses should be sufficiently short, in
order to capture all details. An upper bound of the pa-
rameter δ may be estimated from the (worst case) mul-
tiple reflections and misalignment’s that may happen in
the system.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this work we have proved the security of BB84 in the
presence of any basis dependent, possibly lossy, linear op-
tical imperfections in the channel and receiver/detectors.
The security proof thus covers a combination of several
imperfections: Detection efficiency mismatch, misalign-
ments, mixing between the modes, multiple reflections,
and any basis dependence of those effects. Contrary to
most previous security proofs, this proof does not require
a squashing detector model.
A specific implementation of a QKD system may have
several different imperfections. Ideally there should be
a universal security proof with a set of parameters that
cover all (worst case) imperfections and tolerances of the
equipment. We have made a step towards this goal by
describing generic imperfections at the detector, and by
providing a compact proof, which may hopefully prove
useful for an even more general description.
We have established an upper bound for the secure
key rate by providing two powerful attacks. One of the
attacks may be applied to systems even with the four-
state Bob patch, and this demonstrates the seriousness
of the detection efficiency loophole. This attack is based
on a combination of an optimal individual attack, a time
shift attack, and a large pulse attack. As a consequence
of such types of attacks, the key generation rate may not
increase substantially as a result of the four-state Bob
patch. A possible countermeasure is to use the general
bounds (17) and (18) for estimating the required amount
of privacy amplification.
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Appendix A: Properties of vacuum measurement
Let {|n〉} be an orthonormal basis for a state space
of interest. We refer to the state |0〉 as the “vacuum
state of all modes”, although it could in principle be any
fixed, pure state. A vacuum measurement is a projective
measurement with projectors P = |0〉〈0| and I − P . We
claim that if F is any quantum operation satisfying (9),
9i.e.,
F(|0〉〈0|) = |0〉〈0|, (A1)
the presence of a vacuum measurement before F does
not change the statistics and output state of a vacuum
measurement after F , see Fig. 4.
Vacuum? Vacuum? Vacuum?
F F≡
FIG. 4: The statistics and output state of the vacuum mea-
surement after F is not changed by the introduction of a
vacuum measurement before F .
This result can be proved by using the fact that any
quantum operation can be viewed as a unitary transfor-
mation on an extended state space, with a standard state
|0〉aux as auxiliary input. Due to (A1), we can assume
that the unitary transformation transforms
|0〉 ⊗ |0〉aux → |0〉 ⊗ |0〉aux, (A2)
with no loss of generality.
Consider the right-hand side of the identity (Fig. 4).
Let Paux = |0〉aux〈0|aux. A vacuum measurement at the
input can now be described as a projective measurement
with P ⊗ Paux and I − P ⊗ Paux, since the auxiliary in-
put is fixed at |0〉aux. Clearly, it does not matter if we
measure the auxiliary output with projectors Paux and
I−Paux. In total, the extended measurement at the out-
put is described by projectors P ⊗ Paux, P ⊗ (I − Paux),
(I − P )⊗ Paux, and (I − P )⊗ (I − Paux). Transforming
the projector P ⊗ Paux backwards, we find that the cor-
responding projector at the input is P ⊗ Paux. In other
words, the extended vacuum measurement at the output
contains the vacuum measurement at the input, so the
latter is redundant.
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